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Abstract
This paper presents a surprisingly simple and efficient reliable broadcast algorithm for asynchronous
message-passing systems made up of n processes, among which up to t < n/3 may behave arbitrarily
(Byzantine processes). This algorithm requires two communication steps and n2 messages. (The best
algorithm known so far requires three communication steps and 2n2 messages.)
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1 Introduction
On reliable broadcast Reliable broadcast (RB) is a communication abstraction central to fault-tolerant
distributed systems. It allows each process to broadcast messages to all processes despite failures. More
precisely, it guarantees that all the non-faulty processes will deliver the same set of messages and this set
will include at least all the messages they have broadcast. It can also contain some of the messages broadcast
by faulty processes.
The fundamental property of reliable broadcast lies in the fact that no two correct processes deliver dif-
ferent sets of messages. This communication abstraction is a basic building block used to build a total order
reliable broadcast abstraction (sometimes called “atomic broadcast”), which adds the total order property
on message delivery (see e.g., [1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11]). In turn, total order broadcast is a basic building block
for state machine replication, which is a fundamental paradigm in fault-tolerance.
Reliable broadcast in the presence of Byzantine processes Reliable broadcast has been studied in the
context of Byzantine failures since the eighties. A process commits a Byzantine failure if it behaves arbi-
trarily [8, 10]. Such a behavior can be intentional (also called malicious) or the result of a transient fault
which altered the content of local variables of a process, thereby modifying its intended behavior in an
unpredictable way.
An elegant algorithm, due to G. Bracha, implementing the reliable broadcast abstraction in an asyn-
chronous system of n processes, which communicate by message-passing, and where up to t < n/3 pro-
cesses may be Byzantine is described in [3]. It is shown in [3, 4] that t < n/3 is an upper bound on the
number of Byzantine processes that can be tolerated.
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Bracha’s reliable broadcast algorithm considers that a process is the sender and all non-faulty processes
are the receivers. It is an “echo”-based algorithm. It uses three types of messages, requires three consecutive
communication steps, and (n− 1) + 2n(n− 1) = 2n2 − n− 1 underlying messages.
Content of the paper This paper presents a new Byzantine-tolerant reliable broadcast algorithm, which is
particularly efficient. Like Bracha’s algorithm, this algorithm is signature-free, and optimal from a resilience
point of view, namely, it requires t < n/3. When compared to other algorithms, this algorithm uses only
two types of message, two consecutive communication steps, and (n− 1) + n(n− 1) = n2 − 1 underlying
messages. Another noteworthy feature of the algorithm lies in its simplicity, which rests on an appropriate
constraint used to forward messages.
2 Computation Model
Asynchronous processes The system is made up of a finite set Π of n > 1 asynchronous sequential
processes, namely Π = {p1, . . . , pn}. “Asynchronous” means that each process proceeds at its own speed,
which can vary arbitrarily with time, and always remains unknown to the other processes.
Communication network The processes communicate by exchanging messages through an asynchronous
reliable point-to-point network. “Asynchronous” means that a message that has been sent is eventually
received by its destination process, i.e., there is no bound on message transfer delays. “Reliable” means
that the network does not loose, duplicate, modify, or create messages. “Point-to-point” means that there is
a bi-directional communication channel between each pair of processes. Hence, when a process receives a
message, it can identify its sender.
A process pi sends a message to a process pj by invoking the primitive “send TAG(m) to pj”, where
TAG is the type of the message and m its content. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a process
can send messages to itself. A process receives a message by executing the primitive “receive()”. The
macro-operation “broadcast TAG(m)” is a shortcut for “for j ∈ {1, · · · , n} do send TAG(m) to pj end
for”.
Failure model Up to t processes can exhibit a Byzantine behavior. A Byzantine process is a process
that behaves arbitrarily: it can crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an
arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. Hence, a Byzantine process, which is assumed to
send a message m to all the processes, can send a message m1 to some processes, a different message m2 to
another subset of processes, and no message at all to the other processes. Moreover, Byzantine processes can
collude to “pollute” the computation. They can also control the network in the sense that they can re-order
message deliveries at correct processes. A process that exhibits a Byzantine behavior is also called faulty.
Otherwise, it is correct or non-faulty.
Let us notice that, as each pair of processes is connected by a channel, no Byzantine process can imper-
sonate another process (otherwise, no non-trivial computation can be done).
An intersection property The following lemma states an important property that will be used to prove
the reliable broadcast algorithm.
Lemma 1. Let n > 3t.
(a). Any set containing more than n+t
2
distinct processes, contains at least (t+ 1) non-faulty processes.
2
(b). Any two sets Q1 and Q2 of more than ⌊n+t2 ⌋ processes have at least one correct process in their
intersection.
Proof Proof of (a). We have n+t
2
≥ 4t+1
2
= 2t + 1
2
, from which it follows that any set of more than n+t
2
distinct processes contains at least 2t + 1 processes. The proof then follows from the fact that any set of
2t+ 1 distinct processes contains at least t+ 1 non-faulty processes.
Proof of (b). Let us first observe that, when considering integers, “strictly more than n+t
2
” is equivalent to
“at least ⌊n+t
2
⌋+ 1”.
• Q1 ∪Q2 ⊆ {p1, . . . , pn}. Hence, |Q1 ∪Q2| ≤ n.
• |Q1 ∩Q2| = |Q1|+ |Q2| − |Q1 ∪Q2| ≥ |Q1|+ |Q2| − n ≥ 2(⌊
n+t
2
⌋+ 1) − n > 2(n+t
2
) − n = t.
Hence, |Q1 ∩Q2| ≥ t+ 1, from which it follows that Q1 ∩Q2 contains at least one correct process.
✷Lemma 1
3 Reliable broadcast
The reliable broadcast (denoted RB-broadcast) communication abstraction provides the processes with two
operations denoted RB broadcast() and RB deliver(). As in [6], when a process invokes RB broadcast(),
we say that it “RB-broadcasts a message”. Similarly, when a process executes RB deliver(), we say that it
“RB-delivers a message”. RB-broadcast is defined by the following properties.
• RB-Validity. If a correct process RB-delivers the message MSG(v) from a correct process pi, then pi
RB-broadcast MSG(v).
• RB-Integrity. A correct process RB-delivers at most one message from any process pi.
• RB-Agreement. Given a process pi, no two correct processes ND-deliver distinct messages from pi.
• RB-Termination-1. If a correct process RB-broadcast a message, all correct processes eventually
RB-deliver this message.
• RB-Termination-2. If a correct process RB-delivers a message from pi (possibly faulty) then all
correct processes eventually RB-deliver a message from pi.
On the safety properties’ side RB-validity relates the output (messages RB-delivered) to the inputs (mes-
sages RB-broadcast). RB-integrity states there is no duplication. RB-agreement states that there is no du-
plicity: be the sender correct or not, it is not possible for a correct process to RB-deliver m while another
correct process RB-delivers m′ 6= m.
On the liveness properties’ side The RB-Termination properties state the guarantees on message RB-
delivery. RB-Termination-1 states that a message RB-broadcast by a correct process is RB-delivered by all
correct processes. RB-Termination-2 gives its name to reliable broadcast. Be the sender correct or not, every
message RB-delivered by a correct process is RB-delivered by all correct processes.
It follows that all correct processes RB-deliver the same set of messages, and this set contains at least
all the messages RB-broadcast by the correct processes.
3
Upper bound on t As already indicated, it is proved in [3, 4] that t < n/3 is a necessary and sufficient
condition to implement the reliable broadcast abstraction in an asynchronous message-passing system prone
to process Byzantine failures.
RB-broadcasting a sequence of messages The previous definition considers that each correct process
RB-broadcasts at most one message. It is easily possible to extend it to the case where a correct process
RB-broadcasts a sequence of messages. In the algorithm that follows the identity j of the sender pj must
then be replaced by a pair 〈j, sn〉, where sn is the sequence number associated by pj with the message.
4 Reliable broadcast algorithm
The algorithm Algorithm 1, which implements the reliable broadcast abstraction, consists of a client side
and a server side.
On the client side, when a (correct) process wants to RB-broadcast an application message MSG(vi), it
simply broadcasts the algorithm message INIT(i, vi). On the server side, a process can receive two types of
messages.
• When it receives a message INIT(j, v) (necessarily from process pj as the processes are connected
by bidirectional channels), a process pi broadcasts the message WITNESS(j, v) (line 2) if (a) this
message is the first message INIT() pi receives from pj , and (b) pi has not yet broadcast a message
WITNESS(j,−).
• When a process pi receives a message WITNESS(j, v) (from any process), it does the following.
– If pi has received the same message from “enough-1” processes (where “enough-1” is (t +
1), i.e., at least one correct process sent this message, see the first item of Lemma 1), and
pi has not yet broadcast a message WITNESS(j,−), as in the previous item pi broadcasts this
message WITNESS(j, v). This concludes the “forwarding phase” of pi as far as a message of pj
is concerned.
– If pi received the same message from “enough-2” processes (where “enough-2” means “more
than n+t
2
processes”, i.e., the message was received from at least (t + 1) correct processes, see
the second item of Lemma 1), pi locally RB-delivers MSG(j, v) if not yet done. This concludes
the “RB-delivering phase” of a message from pj , as far as pi is concerned.
operation RB broadcast MSG(vi) is
(1) broadcast INIT(i, vi).
when INIT(j, v) is received from pj do
(2) if (first reception of INIT(j,−) and WITNESS(j,−) not yet broadcast) then broadcast WITNESS(j, v) end if.
when WITNESS(j, v) is received do
(3) if (WITNESS(j, v) received from more than (t+ 1) different processes and WITNESS(j,−) not yet broadcast)
(4) then broadcast WITNESS(j, v)
(5) end if;
(6) if (WITNESS(j, v) received from more than n+t
2
different processes and MSG(j,−) not yet RB delivered
)
(7) then RB deliver MSG(j, v)
(8) end if.
Algorithm 1: Resilience-optimal (t < n/3) reliable broadcast algorithm
4
On the value n+t
2
Let us notice that replacing at line 6 “more than n+t
2
different processes” by “(n − t)
different processes” leaves the algorithm correct. As n − t > n+t
2
, it follows that using “more than n+t
2
different processes” provides a weaker RB-delivery condition, and consequently a more efficient algorithm
from the message RB-delivery point of view. As a simple numerical example, considering n = 21 and
t = 2, we have n− t = 19, which is much greater than the required value 12 (> n+t
2
= 11.5).
Cost of the algorithm Only two types of messages are used (INIT and WITNESS). It is easy to see that
the broadcast of a message by a correct process requires two consecutive communication steps (broadcast
of an INIT message whose receptions entail at most n broadcasts of WITNESS messages). Not counting the
messages that a process sends to itself, a reliable broadcast by a correct process costs (n−1) messages INIT
and at most n(n− 1) messages WITNESS. (As they are not under the control of the algorithm, the messages
sent by Byzantine processes are not counted.)
5 Proof of the Algorithm
Lemma 2. Given any j, a correct process pi forwards at most one message WITNESS(j,−).
Proof The proof follows from the second part of the predicate used at line 2 and line 3. ✷Lemma 2
Lemma 3. Let pj be a correct process which never broadcasts the message INIT (j, v). If the Byzantine
processes broadcast a fake message WITNESS (j, v), no correct process will forward this message at line 2
or line 3.
Proof Let us consider the worst case where t processes are Byzantine, and each of them broadcasts the
same message WITNESS (j, v). The proof follows from the predicates of line 2 and line 3 which remains
always false. The predicate of line 2 because no correct process receives a message INIT(j, v). And the
forwarding predicate of line 3 because, to forward the message WITNESS (j, v), a correct needs to receive it
from (t+ 1) different processes, and it receives at most t such messages. ✷Lemma 3
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 implements the reliable broadcast abstraction in n-process asynchronous message-
passing systems in which up to t < n/3 processes may commit Byzantine failures.
Proof
Proof of the RB-Validity property.
Let pi be a correct process that invokes RB broadcast MSG(v) and consequently broadcasts the message
INIT(i, v) at line 1. The fact that no correct process RB-delivers a message different from MSG(i, v) comes
from the following observation. To RB-deliver a message MSG(i, v′), a correct process must receive the
message WITNESS(i, v′) from more than n+t
2
different processes (line 6). But if the (at most) t Byzantine
processes forge a fake message WITNESS(i, v′), with v 6= v′, this message will never be forwarded by cor-
rect processes (Lemma 3). As n+t
2
> t, it follows from the predicate of line 6 that the content of the message
RB-delivered by any correct process cannot be different from (i, v).
Proof of the RB-Integrity property.
This property follows directly from the RB-delivery predicate of line 6.
5
Proof of the RB-Agreement property.
Let pi and pj be two correct processes such that pi RB-delivers MSG(k, v) while pj RB-delivers MSG(k, v′).
As pi (resp., pj) RB-delivers MSG(k, v) (resp., MSG(k, v′)), it follows from the RB-delivery predicate of
line 6 that pi (resp., pj) received the message WITNESS(k, v) (resp., WITNESS(k, v′)) from a set Qi (resp.,
Qj) containing more than n+t2 processes. It follows from item (b) of Lemma 1 that Qi ∩ Qj contains at
least one correct process. As a correct process broadcasts a single message WITNESS(k,−) (Lemma 2), we
necessarily have v = v′.
Proof of the RB-Termination-1 property.
Let pi be a correct process that invokes RB broadcast MSG(v) and consequently broadcasts the message
INIT(i, vi) at line 1.
It follows that any correct process pj receives this message. Let us remember that, due to the network
connectivity assumption, there is a channel connecting pi to pj and consequently the message INIT(i, v) can-
not be a fake message forged by a Byzantine process. Moreover, due to Lemma 3, no message WITNESS(i, v′ ),
with v′ 6= v, forged by Byzantine processes, can be forward by a correct process at lines 3-4.
Hence, when pj receives INIT(i, v), it broadcasts the message WITNESS(i, v) at line 2. It follows that
every correct process receives this message from (n−t) > n+t
2
different processes and consequently locally
RB-delivers the message MSG(i, v) at lines 6-8, which proves the property.
Proof of the RB-Termination-2 property.
Let pi be a process that RB-delivers the message MSG(k, v). It follows that the RB-delivery predicate of
line 6 is true for pi, and consequently pi received the message WITNESS(k, v) from more than n+t2 different
processes. Due to item (a) of Lemma 1, this means that pi received WITNESS(k, v) from at least (t + 1)
correct processes.
Due to the predicate of line 3, it follows that (if not yet done at line 2) each correct process eventually
broadcasts the message WITNESS(k, v). As there are at least n − t > n+t
2
correct processes, each of them
receives WITNESS(k, v) from more than n+t
2
different processes, and consequently RB-delivers MSG(k, v)
at line 7, which proves the property.
✷Theorem 1
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